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Abstract Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a
signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a
generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is
shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire
informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how
information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.
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In the beginning was information. The word came later.
Dretske (1981)
1 Epistemology
Dretske was calling for a reorientation in epistemology. He did not think that
epistemologists should spend their time on little puzzles or on rehashing ancient
arguments about skepticism. Rather, he held that epistemology by would be better
served by studying the flow of information. I think so too. Other pioneers of this
naturalistic point of view, in somewhat different ways, are Millikan (1984) and
Harms (2004). Information is carried by signals. It flows through signaling
networks.
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2 Information
We must first ask: What is the information in a signal? The framework of signaling
games, and of evolutionary or learning dynamics, will help us to answer this
question. There are really two questions: What is the informational content of a
signal? and What is the quantity of information in a signal? Some philosophers who
have looked at Shannon’s information theory and seen that he is not trying to answer
either question, have concluded that mathematical information theory is irrelevant
to these concerns. I believe that this is a mistake. One need not move very far from
Shannon to find the answer to the second question in the information concept of
Kullback and Leibler (1951).1 To answer the first question, a new notion of the
informational content of a signal is introduced here.
The informational content of a signal consists in how the signal affects
probabilities. The quantity of information in a signal is measured by how far it
moves probabilities. Suppose, for instance, that there are two states, initially
equiprobable. Suppose that signal A moves the probabilities to 9/10 for State 1 and
1/10 for state 2, and that signal B moves the probabilities in exactly the opposite
way, 1/10 for state 1 and 9/10 for state 2. Even without knowing exactly how we are
going to measure quantity of information, we know by considerations of symmetry
that these two signals contain the same amount of information. They move the
initial probabilities by the same amount. But they do not have the same
informational content, because they move the initial probabilities in different
directions. Signal A moves the probability of state 1 up; signal B moves it down.
Some philosophers may balk at any use of the term information at this point. They
jump to the conclusion that information theory deals only with quantity of
information and is irrelevant to the question of content. Hold on, we will get to
informational content.
The key to information is moving probabilities. What probabilities? We use
sender–receiver signaling games of the kind introduced by Lewis (1969)2 (and
generalizations of them) as a framework allowing a precise treatment of these
questions. As always, there is the question whether the framework is being correctly
applied to model the situation of interest. It is assumed here that it is. We will study
evolution of strategies3 in these games to show how adaptive dynamics can create
informational content where none existed originally.
The simplest Lewis signaling games work like this: nature chooses a state from
among a set of possible states4 with some probability. The sender observes the state
and chooses a signal to send from a set of possible signals. The receiver observes the
signal and chooses an act. Both sender and receiver have pure common interest;
they both get paid off either one or zero according to whether the act is appropriate
for the state. The possible signals have no pre-assigned meaning or content. If they
1 See also Lindley (1956). Compare Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1953).
2 See also Harms (2004).
3 As in Skyrms (1996, 1999, 2004).
4 Understood to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.
156 B. Skyrms
123
are to acquire meaning it is must be as a result of the interaction of the strategies of
sender and receiver.
The strategies of sender and receiver evolve over time, driven by the payoffs,
according to some adaptive dynamics. One interpretation has frequencies of sender
types and receiver types evolving in a large population according to evolutionary
dynamics. Another has a sender and receiver learn in repeated interactions
according to reinforcement learning.5
We are interested in information not only in equilibrium, but also as interactions
are still evolving. It is part of the structure of the game that the states occur with
certain probabilities. The probabilities of sender and receiver strategies evolve
through time. In learning dynamics these probabilities are modified by the learning
rule; in evolution they are interpreted as population frequencies. At any given time,
in or out of equilibrium, all these probabilities are well-defined. Taken together,
they give us all the probabilities that we need to assess the content and quantity of
information in a signal at that time.6 Informational content evolves as strategies
evolve.
How should we measure the quantity of information in a signal? The information
in the signal about a state depends on a comparison of the probability of the state
given that this signal was sent and the unconditional probability of the signal. We




where prsig is the probability conditional on getting the signal. This is a key quantity.
The way that the signal changes the probability of the state is just by multiplication
by this quantity.
When a signal does not change the probability of a state at all—for instance if the
sender sends the same signal in all states—the ratio is equal to one, but we would
like to say that the quantity of information is zero. We can achieve this by taking the
logarithm to define the quantity of information as:




This is the information in the signal in favor of that state. If we take the logarithm to
the base 2, we are measuring the information in bits.
A signal carries information about many states so to get an overall measure of
information in the signal we can take a weighted average, with the weights being the
probabilities of the states conditional on getting the signal:
Istates signalð Þ ¼
X
i
prsig state ið Þ log prsig state ið Þ=pr state ið Þ
h i
5 For application of adaptive dynamics that is driven by interactions with neighbors on a spatial structure,
see Zollman (2005).
6 The probabilities never really hit zero or one, although they may converge towards them. So
conditional probabilities are well-defined. We don’t have to worry about dividing by zero. If it appears in
an example that we are dividing by zero, throw in a little epsilon.
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This is the average information about states in the signal. It sometimes called the
Kullback–Leibler distance, or the information gained. This was introduced over
50 years ago, shortly after Claude Shannon published his original paper on
information theory.7 Alan Turing used almost the same concept in his work
breaking the German Enigma code during World War II.8
For example, consider the simplest Lewis signaling game. There are two states,
two signals and two acts, with the states equiprobable. A signal moves the
probabilities of the states, and how it moves the probability of the second state is
determined by how much it moves the probability of the first, so we can plot the
average information in the signal as a function of the probability of the first state
given the signal, as shown in Fig. 1.
If the signal does not move the probability off one-half the information is 0; if it
moves the probability a little there is a little information; if it moves the probability
all the way to one or to zero, the information in the signal is 1 bit. In a perfect
signaling-system one signal moves the probability to one and the other moves it to
zero, so each of the two signals carries 1 bit of information.
The situation is different if the states are not initially equiprobable. Suppose that
state one is 6/10 and of state 2 is 4/10. Then a signal that was sent only in state two
would carry more information than one that only came in state one because it would
move the initial probabilities more, as shown in Fig. 2.
In a game with four equiprobable states a signal that gives one of the states
probability one carries 2 bits of information about the state. Compare a somewhat
Fig. 1 Information as a function of probability of state 1 given signal, states initially equiprobable
7 Shannon (1948), Shannon and Weaver (1949), Kullback and Leibler (1951), Kullback (1959). See also
Lindley (1956) on the information provided by an experiment.
8 See I. J. Good’s preface to Good (1983). In Good (1950) this is expected ‘‘weight of evidence’’.
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more interesting case,9 where nature chooses one of four states by independently
flipping two fair coins. Coin 1 determines up or down—let us say—and coin 2
determines left or right. The four states, up-left etc., are equiprobable. There are now
two senders. Sender 1 can only observe whether nature has chosen up or down; sender
2 observes whether it is left or right. Each sends one of two signals to the receiver.
 !   
The receiver chooses among four acts, one right for each state.
In an optimal signaling system equilibrium for this little signaling network, pairs
of sender signals identify each of the four states with probability one—and the
receiver makes the most of the information in the signals. In such a signaling system
each signal carries 1 bit of information. 1 bit from each of the senders adds up to the
2 bits we had with one sender and four signals. This is a mathematical convenience
of having taken the logarithms.10
3 Information about the act
All of the information discussed so far is defined by the probabilities with which
nature chooses acts and the probabilities of the sender strategies. But there is also a
different kind of information in the signals. We have been discussing information
Fig. 2 Information as a function of probability of state 1 given signal, states initially pr. 6, .4
9 See Skyrms (2004, 2009a, b) and Barrett (2007) for signaling games with multiple senders and
receivers.
10 We don’t always get additivity. For example, if the senders have both made the same observation the
information in the two signals wouldn’t add to get the information in their combination.
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about the state of nature, but there is also information about the act that will be
chosen. The definitions are entirely analogous to those of information about the
state.
Taken together, probabilities of the states, probabilities of sender’s strategies, and
probabilities of receiver’s strategies give us unconditional probabilities of the acts.
Just add up the probabilities of all combinations that give the act in question to get
its initial probability. Probabilities of receiver’s strategies alone give us probability
of acts given a certain signal. The information in the signal is now measured by how
much the signal moves the probabilities of the acts. The average information about
the act in a signal is:
Iacts signalð Þ ¼
X
i
prsig act ið Þ log prsig act ið Þ=pr act ið Þ
h i
The definition has just the same form and rationale as the definition of information
about the state. There are thus two kinds of information in a signal, and two
quantities summarizing amounts of information in a signal.
The two quantities need not be the same. For instance, suppose that the sender
chooses a different signal for each state but the receiver isn’t paying attention and
always does the same act. Then there is plenty of information about the states in the
signals, but zero information about the acts. Conversely, suppose that the sender
chooses signals at random but the receiver uses the signals to discriminate between
acts. Then there is zero information about the states in the signals, but there is
information about the acts. There may be more states than acts or more acts than
states. It is only in special cases that the two quantities of information are the same.
4 Creation of information in a signal
Let us reflect on the role of adaptive dynamics. Evolution can create information. It
is not simply a question of learning to use information that is lying around, as is the
case when we observe a fixed nature. With natural signs—smoke means fire—the
information about states is just there, and we need to learn how to utilize it. Nature
is not playing a game and does not have alternative strategies. Information about
acts arrives on the scene when we learn to react appropriately to the information
about states contained in the smoke. But in signaling games, there may be no initial
information about acts or states in the signals. Senders and receivers may just be
acting randomly. When evolution (or learning) leads to a signaling system,
information is created. Symmetry-breaking shows how information can be created
out of nothing. Figure 3 shows the creation of information about states by
reinforcement learning.
In this simplest signaling game, with two equiprobable states, two signals, and
two acts, it has been proved that both evolution11 and reinforcement learning12 lead
11 Huttegger (2007) and Hofbauer and Huttegger (2008).
12 Argiento et al. (2008).
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to perfect signaling with probability one. For now, more complex cases are
investigated by simulation.
5 Informational content
Now that we know how to measure the quantity of information in a signal, let us
return to informational content. This is sometimes supposed to be very problematic,
but I think that it is remarkably straightforward. Quantity of information is just a
summary number—1 bit, 2 bits, etc. Informational content must be a vector.13
Consider the information in a signal about states, where there are four states. The
informational content of a signal tells us how the signal affects the probabilities of
each of the four states. It is a vector with four components, one for each state. Each
component tells us how the probability of that state moves. So we can take the
informational content of a signal to be the vector:
\ log prsig state 1ð Þ=pr state 1ð Þ
h i
; log prsig state 2ð Þ= pr state 2ð Þ
h i
; . . .:[
The informational content about acts in the signal is another vector of the same
form. Suppose that there are four states, initially equiprobable, and signal 2 is sent
only in state 2. Then the informational content about states of signal 2 is:
IStates Signal 2ð Þ ¼ \1; 2;1;1[
The -? components tell you that those states end up with probability zero. The
entry for state 2 tells you how much its probability has moved. If the starting
probabilities had been different, this entry could have been different. For instance, if







Fig. 3 Creation of Information ex nihilo by reinforcement learning
13 This is informational content within a given signaling game. It is implicit that the vector applies to the
states or acts of this game.
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the initial probability of this state had been 1/16 with everything else the same, the
information about states in signal 2 would have been:
IStates Signal 2ð Þ ¼ \1; 4;1;1[
‘‘Wait a minute,’’ someone is sure to say at this point. ‘‘Something very
important has been left out!’’ What is it? ‘‘But shouldn’t the content—at least the
declarative content—of a signal be a proposition? And isn’t a proposition a set of
possible worlds or situations?’’
Suppose a proposition is taken to be a set of states. (States can be individuated
finely, and there can be lots of states if you please.) It asserts that the true state is a
member of that set. A proposition can just as well be specified by giving the set of
states that the true state is not in. That is what the -? components of the information
vector do. If a signal carries propositional information, that information can be read
off the informational content vector. For instance, if the signal ‘‘tells you’’ that it is
‘‘state 2 or state 4’’ in our example, then the content vector will have the form:
IStates Signal 2ð Þ ¼ \1; ;1; [
with the minus infinity components ruling out states 1 and 3, and the blanks being
filled by numbers specifying how the probabilities of state 2 and 4 have moved.
That is to say that the familiar notion of propositional content as set of possible
situations is a rather special case of the much richer information-theoretic account
of content. This vector specifies more than the propositional content, and some
signals will not have propositional content at all. It is the traditional account that has
left something out.
6 Objective and subjective information
None of the probabilities used so far are degrees-of-belief of sender and receiver.
They are objective probabilities, determined by nature and the evolutionary or
learning process. Organisms (or organs) playing the role of sender and receiver need
have no cognitive capacities.
But suppose that they do. Suppose that a sender and receiver are human and that
they try to think rationally about the signaling game. Suppose that the sender has
subjective probabilities over the receiver’s strategies and the receiver has subjective
probabilities over the sender’s strategies, and that both have subjective probabilities
over the states. These subjective probabilities are just degrees-of-belief; they may
not be in line with the objective probabilities at all. Then each signal carries two
additional kinds of subjective information. There is subjective information about
how the receiver will react, which lives in the sender’s degrees-of-belief. This is of
interest to a sender who wants to get a receiver to do something. There is subjective
information about what state that the sender observed, which lives in the receiver’s
degrees of belief. This is of interest to a receiver who wants to use the sender as a
source of information about the states. Both sender and receiver use these kinds of
information in decision making. Both sender and receiver strive (1) to act optimally
given their subjective probabilities and (2) to learn to bring subjective probabilities
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in concordance with the objective probabilities in the world. They may or may not
succeed. So when we are applying the account to beings that can reasonably be
thought to have subjective probabilities, such as perhaps ourselves, we now have at
least four types of informational content—two objective and two subjective. If the
signaling game is more complex, for instance if there is an eavesdropper, the
informational structure becomes richer.
7 The flow of information
In the signaling equilibrium of a Lewis Sender–Receiver game, information is
transmitted from sender to receiver, but it is only in the most trivial sense that we
can be said to have a flow of information. Let us consider a little signaling chain.
 !  ! 
There are a sender, an intermediary, and a receiver. Nature chooses one of two states
with equal probability. The sender observes the state, chooses one of two signals
and sends it to the intermediary, the intermediary observes the sender’s signal,
chooses one her own two signals, and sends it to the receiver. (The intermediary’s
set of signals may or may not match that of the sender.) The receiver observes the
intermediary’s signal and chooses one of two acts. If the act matches the state,
sender, intermediary and receiver all get a payoff of one, otherwise a payoff of zero.
It is tempting to assume that these agents already have signaling for simpler
sender–receiver interactions to build upon. But even if they do not, adaptive
dynamics can carry them to a signaling system, as shown in Fig. 4.
Although reinforcement learning succeeds in creating a signaling chain without a
pre-existing signaling background, notice that it takes a much longer time than in
the simpler two-agent model.
The speed with which the chain signaling system can be learned is much
improved if the sender and receiver have pre-existing signaling systems. They need
not even be the same signaling system. Sender and receiver can have different
‘‘languages’’ so that the intermediary has to act as a ‘‘translator’’, or signal












































Fig. 4 Emergence of a
signaling chain ex nihilo by
reinforcement learning
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receiver used the same tokens as signals but with opposite meanings. For example,
sender’s and receivers strategies are:
Sender Receiver
State 1) red red ) Act 2
State 2 ) blue blue ) Act 1
A successful translator must learn to receive one signal and send another, so that
the chain leads to a successful outcome.
Sender Translator Receiver
State 1 ) red see red ) send blue blue ) Act 1
State 2 ) blue see blue ) send red red ) Act 2
The translator’s learning problem is really quite simple, and she can learn to
complete the chain very quickly.
In this signaling chain equilibrium, the sender’s signal to the translator contains
one bit of information about the state and the translator’ signal to the receiver
contains one bit of information about the state. And on any play, the translator’s
signal to the receiver has the same informational content as the sender’s signal to
her. Information flows from sender through translator to receiver. The receiver then
acts just as she would have if she had observed the state directly.
What we have just illustrated in the simplest signaling chain can happen in longer
chains, and more generally, in signaling networks. Information is processed by the
flow of information through such networks. This is true both internally and socially.
The analysis of information flow in signaling networks is a new challenge for
naturalistic epistemology.
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